A single wealthy individual could potentially finance an entire political party’s campaign under proposed changes to Fiji’s political finance laws, with voters only learning about the contribution after they have cast their ballots.
That is the central concern raised by the Centre for Democracy & Dialogue (CDD) in its submission on the Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) (Amendment) Bill 2026.
CDD has urged Parliament to retain Fiji’s existing $10,000 annual aggregate donation cap and reject a proposal that would open political financing to individuals who are neither Fijian citizens nor former citizens. Under the Bill, such foreign donors would be required to declare their contributions within 60 days after polling.
Timing is a critical factor in this regard.
Disclosure after an election may provide a record for subsequent scrutiny, but it cannot give voters information about who is financing a party before they decide whom to support.
The organisation also questioned how effectively Fiji could enforce a disclosure obligation against an overseas donor with no residence, assets or other meaningful presence in the country.
The concern goes beyond just the influence of foreign money.
CDD argued that the Bill risks confusing two fundamentally different safeguards, which are the limits on how much political actors can spend and limits on how much any one donor can contribute.
A spending ceiling may restrict the amount a party can put into an election campaign. It does not necessarily prevent that party from becoming financially dependent on one wealthy individual.
Under the Bill, the proposed party expenditure ceiling is $3 million. Without a donation cap, CDD points out, one individual could theoretically provide the entire amount. If that individual were a foreign donor under the proposed provision, the financial relationship would be even further removed from Fiji’s electorate.
The transparency question
CDD is similarly concerned about the proposed removal of existing personal financial disclosure requirements covering specified political party officials and candidates.
Its argument is not that every politician who accumulates wealth has acted improperly. Rather, personal declarations provide a baseline against which changes in assets, income, liabilities and financial interests can later be examined.
A campaign expenditure return answers the question of how much money was raised and spent during an election.
But it does not necessarily answer another on what does a candidate or office holder own, owe or have a financial interest in?
CDD therefore argues that campaign expenditure controls should be added to, rather than substituted for, personal financial disclosure. It accepts that the existing regime may be lengthy, overlapping and subject to disproportionate penalties, but says those shortcomings justify reform rather than wholesale removal.
This is an important distinction because the Bill is attempting to modernise Fiji’s political finance framework while simultaneously removing some of the mechanisms through which financial interests have traditionally been made visible.
$19.5 million question
CDD does, however, support the principle of introducing campaign spending limits.
The Bill proposes a $300,000 ceiling for individual candidates and $3 million for political parties. CDD said the principle is sound but questions whether the proposed figures are sufficiently justified and, crucially, how the two limits are intended to operate together.
If the party ceiling is separate from the individual candidate ceilings, a party fielding 55 candidates could theoretically have $16.5 million in candidate allowances on top of its $3 million party allowance — a potential combined framework of $19.5 million.
CDD stresses that this is an illustration of the possible effect of the drafting, not a settled interpretation of the Bill.
It argues Parliament should resolve the issue before the legislation becomes law, alongside clear rules governing shared advertising, rallies, transport and other activities benefiting both parties and candidates.
Otherwise, the effectiveness of a spending ceiling could depend heavily on where expenditure is recorded.
When does a gift become more than a gift?
Another contentious proposal concerns gifts to villages and community groups.
The Bill would treat certain declared gifts as campaign expenditure while providing that a declared gift to a village or community group would not constitute bribery under section 140 of the Electoral Act.
CDD wants that exemption deleted as it believes disclosure and legality are not the same thing.
Recording a benefit in an electoral return does not necessarily change its purpose. If a benefit is intended to secure political support, CDD argues, declaring it should not automatically provide protection from bribery or vote-buying laws. It also raises questions about how “village”, “community group”, “territory” and the value and repetition of gifts would be defined.
CDD makes clear that it does not equate genuine customary protocol with bribery. Its concern is that a broad statutory exemption could create an avenue through which well-funded political contestants acquire access or goodwill that less wealthy competitors cannot match.
A wider accountability
framework
The submission ultimately goes beyond donations and campaign spending.
CDD wants predictable commencement provisions, clearer and more proportionate offences, safeguards around the Registrar’s compulsory information-gathering powers and court oversight before involuntary deregistration of political parties takes effect.
It also calls for standardised electronic filing, a searchable public disclosure portal and a register of enforcement decisions. Donor eligibility should, in its view, be linked to the national electoral roll to reduce the possibility of fictitious identities or nominee arrangements.
It further proposes modest public funding for registered parties, including an incentive for parties that nominate and support women candidates.
The broader argument is therefore not against political finance reform. CDD supports campaign expenditure limits and more proportionate enforcement.
Its warning is that one safeguard should not be used to justify dismantling another.
The debate over the Bill is consequently larger than whether political parties should be allowed to spend $3 million or candidates $300,000.
It is about the architecture of political accountability — who can put money into politics, how much influence that money can buy, what voters are allowed to know before polling day, and what financial interests political actors must continue to disclose.
CDD’s view therefore underscores not just the need for genuine reform but also more importantly how seamlessly the proposed safeguards will operate together.
The submission argues that expenditure limits can be useful, but they cannot by themselves answer the more fundamental question of who ultimately has the greatest financial influence over political power in Fiji.
CDD executive director, Nilesh Lal (left) presents the submission before the parliamentary committee on Justice, Law and Human Rights. Picture: PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF FIJI
