Part 1 established an uncomfortable contradiction: Extraordinary iTaukei ownership of land and natural resources has not automatically translated into broad-based prosperity for ordinary iTaukei. But weak outcomes alone do not prove elite capture. So how would we know?
Follow the chain: Resources Institutions Decisions & Incentives Productive Opportunity Enterprise & Employment Household Prosperity
If broad-based prosperity is not emerging, ask: Where is the chain breaking and why?
Put political power to the outcomes test
For generations, Fiji has debated political and constitutional power in the name of protecting and advancing iTaukei interests, but political power is not prosperity. Political power is an input.
Its value depends on what it delivers: Political Power Institutions Decisions & Resource Allocation Economic Opportunity Household Prosperity
So during periods when governments and institutions claiming a strong mandate to advance iTaukei interests exercised substantial authority, what happened to ordinary iTaukei?
-Did poverty decline?
-Did enterprise expand?
-Did resource owners gain greater economic agency?
-Did education translate into higher-productivity employment?
-Did household incomes and assets rise?
-Did intergenerational wealth grow?
These are not anti-iTaukei questions. If iTaukei advancement is the objective, these are precisely the questions we should ask. The measure of political power is not how much authority was acquired. It is what that authority delivered.
Can identity displace accountability?
Political debate concerning iTaukei interests has repeatedly centred on race, land, identity, chiefly authority, religion, indigenous rights, constitutions and political power. These issues matter, but economic advancement follows another chain:
Resources Investment Productivity Enterprise Employment Income Wealth
So we should ask: Has measuring iTaukei advancement primarily through political representation, constitutional protection and relative ethnic power sometimes displaced scrutiny of socioeconomic performance? No conspiracy needs to be assumed.
When success is measured by how much authority is acquired rather than what that authority delivers, weak performance can escape accountability.
And when economic frustration is interpreted mainly through comparison with another ethnic community, attention can shift away from institutions operating in the name of ordinary iTaukei.
The success of another community cannot explain the internal performance of your own institutions. Instead of asking:· Who has more? Ask: What have our institutions delivered?
Political independence ≠ institutional decolonisation
History matters here. nBritish colonial administration formalised, codified and reshaped aspects of chiefly and indigenous authority within a system of indirect rule. Methodism also became deeply embedded in indigenous society, developing complex relationships with chiefly authority and the colonial state.
That does not mean today’s institutions are simply colonial institutions or that contemporary leaders reproduce colonial rule, but Fiji became politically independent in 1970.
So ask:
-Did political independence also produce institutional decolonisation?
-Which concentrations of authority changed?
-Which decision-making structures became more accountable?
-How much agency did ordinary resource owners gain?
-How did leadership selection, economic participation and institutional accountability change?
Continuity of institutional form does not prove continuity of function, but changing structures or names does not necessarily change underlying incentives either.
The historical question matters because of the modern one: Do today’s institutions maximise the agency and opportunity of ordinary iTaukei while protecting communal resources?
Look inside the iTaukei system
This is where the elite-capture hypothesis must be tested. Comparing iTaukei and Indo-Fijian outcomes can demonstrate disparity. It cannot establish elite capture. For that, look within the iTaukei population.
-Who controls important decisions?
-Who receives income generated from communal resources?
-Who gains access to development finance and commercial opportunities?
-Who occupies positions of institutional authority?
-How broadly are benefits distributed?
-Can ordinary owners influence decisions concerning resources held in their name?
-Can capable people outside established networks enter leadership?
-Who holds institutions accountable when they fail?
The distinction is fundamental. Broad iTaukei disadvantage establishes a development problem. Concentrated authority and benefits combined with weak accountability would provide stronger evidence of elite capture.
Test the alternatives
Elite capture should not become the explanation for every disappointing outcome. Geography matters. Historical disadvantage and commercial networks matter. Education and skills matter.
Access to finance and markets matters. Coups and political instability matter. Global conditions matter. And communities may legitimately prioritise customary use, subsistence, conservation or cultural continuity over maximum commercial return.
These are serious alternative explanations, but their existence does not exempt institutions from scrutiny. The question is not which explanation best suits our politics. It is how much each explanation actually explains.
Try to prove elite capture wrong
A serious hypothesis must be capable of being weakened by evidence. If elite capture is not a significant problem, over time we should expect:
-Poverty Unemployment Business formation & survival High-productivity employment Household incomes & assets Intergenerational mobility Economic agency over resources
And institutionally:
-Participation Transparency Broad distribution of benefits Independent evaluation Accountability
If these outcomes are occurring sustainably and broadly, the elite-capture hypothesis weakens.
If decision-making and benefits remain concentrated, accountability remains weak and broad-based outcomes remain persistently poor, it deserves deeper investigation.
The purpose is not to prosecute institutions.
It is to measure them.
Measure advancement, not authority
Perhaps Fiji needs an annual iTaukei Advancement Dashboard. Measure five things:
-Household wellbeing — poverty, food security, water security, energy security, real household income and assets.
-Productive opportunity — employment, productivity and resource utilisation where owners seek development.
-Enterprise — business formation, survival, scaling and access to capital.
-Human capability — education, skills and high-productivity employment.
-Distribution and accountability — who benefits, how broadly benefits are distributed, transparency and independent evaluation.
Publish it annually. Governments change. Leaders change. Institutions change. The scoreboard should not. Then advancement becomes measurable rather than rhetorical.
Ask better questions
This brings us back to the grievance that began this discussion: The vulagi became wealthy while the indigenous owners became poor.
Perhaps that directs attention towards the wrong question. Instead of: Why did the vulagi become wealthy? Ask: Why haven’t extraordinary iTaukei resources produced greater prosperity for ordinary iTaukei?
Instead of: Which ethnic group has too much? Ask: · Where does the resource-to-prosperity chain break?
Instead of: How much political power do we possess? Ask: What has that power actually delivered?
That shifts the debate:
-Ethnicity Institutions
-Grievance Evidence
-Political Authority Economic Capability
-Blame Accountability
The principle is simple:
-Resources are an asset.
-Political power is an input.
-Institutions are the mechanism.
-Productive opportunity is the pathway.
The wellbeing of ordinary iTaukei is the outcome. The ultimate measure of leadership is not how much authority it acquires in the name of ordinary iTaukei. It is what that authority actually delivers for them. If decision-making authority and economic benefits are concentrated, accountability is weak and broad-based outcomes remain persistently poor, elite capture deserves serious examination.
If the evidence shows otherwise, we should accept that too because the objective is not to prove elite capture. It is to demand evidence of advancement.
SUNIL CHAND is an engineer and reform strategist with over 30 years of senior leadership experience across manufacturing, regulation and higher education, including strategic and operational roles. The views expressed herein are his own and not those of this newspaper.
