OPINION I Constitutional crossroads – The responsibility of Fijian political actors and parliamentarians

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Fijian political actors and, most particularly parliamentarians stand at a defining juncture in Fiji’s constitutional history.

Their decision whether to retain, amend or remove the entrenched provisions of the 2013 Constitution is not merely a question of constitutional reform; it is a decision that will determine the continuity, stability, legitimacy and future direction of the nation’s constitutional order.

They are entrusted with a responsibility that extends beyond the political interests and parliamentary mandates of the present generation. It is a responsibility to the rule of law, the preservation of constitutional certainty and the generations that will inherit the consequences of their decisions.

The question before them is therefore profound: Whether constitutional reform should strengthen the existing legal order through lawful and carefully considered change or dismantle its foundational safeguards without a legally sustainable framework to replace them.

History will ultimately judge not simply what they chose to change, but whether they understood the constitutional consequences of what they chose to remove.

There are four fundamental legal and constitutional reasons why the proposed removal of entrenched constitutional immunity provisions gives rise to an ultimate Constitutional Catch-22.

The paradox lies in the fact that those seeking to dismantle existing constitutional immunities must themselves confront the unresolved legal consequences of removing the very protections upon which constitutional continuity, institutional stability, legal certainty and the validity of past and present governmental actions may depend.

In attempting to abolish immunity in the name of constitutional reform, reformers may inadvertently create a legal vacuum that necessitates an alternative framework of constitutional protection to preserve the legality and finality of their own actions.

The result is a profound constitutional contradiction: the removal of immunity cannot be treated as a simple exercise in constitutional amendment without first resolving the legal, institutional and transitional consequences that such removal inevitably generates.

The four reasons below demonstrate why this Catch-22 arises and why it presents a fundamental challenge to the rule of law and the continuity of Fiji’s constitutional order.

Reasons why removing entrenched immunity creates a constitutional dilemma

The central legal argument is that those advocating the removal of constitutional immunity must first demonstrate that the proposed removal, the process by which it is achieved, and the legal consequences of the change are themselves constitutionally lawful.

1. Entrenched immunity cannot be removed by constitutional circumvention

Constitutional entrenchment

Reason: The Constitution establishes its own limitations on constitutional amendment. Parliament, Government or individual reformers cannot simply disregard those limitations because they consider an existing constitutional provision undesirable.

Fijian statutory provisions:

i. Section 2: Supremacy of the Constitution.

Section 158: Entrenchment of the immunity provisions.

Section 159(1): The Constitution may only be amended through the prescribed constitutional procedure.

Section 159(2)(a) and (b): Protect Chapter 10 and Part D of Chapter 12 against repeal or diminution.

Section 160: Prescribes the constitutional amendment procedure.

An important qualification is that the Supreme Court’s Opinion of 29 August 2025 modified the operation of section 159, including removing the effect of section 159(2)(c). However, it retained the protections in sections 159(2)(a) and (b). Those protections cannot simply be ignored.

Application: If a proposed reform purports to remove or diminish protections that remain constitutionally entrenched, the proponents must confront the constitutional prohibition itself. Merely securing political or parliamentary support does not establish that the amendment is legally permissible.

The Catch-22: The reformers cannot claim constitutional authority to dismantle a protection while disregarding the constitutional limits governing that very authority.

2. Equality before the law prohibits selective or self-serving immunity

Equality and consistency

Reason: Constitutional reform must be based on a defensible legal principle. Reformers cannot convincingly argue that immunity is inherently illegitimate for previous officeholders while simultaneously creating equivalent protections for themselves without explaining the legal distinction.

Fijian statutory provisions:

i. Section 26: Right to equality and freedom from discrimination.

Section 149: Constitutional code of conduct.

Section 2: Constitutional supremacy.

Sections 155–158: Existing constitutional immunity framework.

Application: If the justification for removing existing immunity is accountability, that principle must apply consistently. Any proposed replacement immunity must have an independently defensible constitutional purpose, objective criteria, defined beneficiaries and appropriate limitations.

The Catch-22: If immunity is unacceptable because it protects former officeholders from accountability, on what principled basis can new officeholders justify comparable protection for themselves?

3. Removal creates legal uncertainty, transitional liability and questions of finality

Legal continuity

Reason: Constitutional reform cannot be considered solely in terms of removing a provision. It must also address the legal consequences for past conduct, completed decisions, existing proceedings, public institutions, liabilities and rights already established under the existing constitutional order.

Fijian statutory provisions:

i. Sections 165–174: Chapter 12, Part D, transitional provisions.

Section 172: Preservation of rights and obligations.

Section 173: Preservation of laws.

Section 174: Judicial proceedings.

Section 158: Entrenchment of immunity.

Particularly important is the relationship between Chapter 10 and Part D of Chapter 12, both of which are expressly protected under section 159(2)(a) and (b), as retained following the 2025 Supreme Court Opinion.

Application: Removing immunity raises questions including:

Whether past conduct becomes newly actionable.

Whether completed legal decisions can be reopened.

Whether existing proceedings and liabilities survive.

Whether successor institutions inherit unresolved legal obligations.

Whether the State may face claims arising from the change.

A new immunity framework for reformers would not automatically resolve these questions. It would itself require a lawful constitutional foundation.

The Catch-22: Reformers seeking to reopen the legal consequences of the past may create uncertainty about the legality and finality of their own present and future decisions.

4. Reformers cannot manufacture immunity to legitimise their own constitutional actions

Rule of law and institutional accountability

Reason: Those who exercise constitutional authority must remain accountable to the law. A new immunity arrangement cannot simply be created to shield reformers from the legal consequences of decisions they have made, particularly where those decisions are challenged as constitutionally invalid.

This produces the ultimate Catch-22: if existing immunity is said to undermine accountability, a replacement immunity designed to protect the reformers themselves risks reproducing the very defect they claim to be correcting.

Fijian statutory provisions:

i. Section 2: Supremacy of the Constitution.

Section 17: Freedom of speech, expression and publication.

Section 26: Equality before the law.

Section 97: Judicial authority and independence.

Sections 159–160: Constitutional amendment requirements.

Section 149: Code of conduct for constitutional officeholders.

Application: Reformers cannot assume that their own actions will acquire immunity simply because they are undertaken in the name of constitutional reform. Their actions must be legally authorised, constitutionally valid and subject to appropriate judicial scrutiny.

The Catch-22: If previous officeholders cannot claim immunity merely because they exercised public authority, present reformers cannot automatically claim immunity merely because they are implementing constitutional change.

Conclusion

Those who advocate the abolition of Fiji’s entrenched constitutional immunities must confront an unavoidable constitutional contradiction: they seek to dismantle the legal protections of their predecessors while potentially requiring a new immunity framework to protect the legality, validity and finality of their own constitutional actions.

Yet they cannot create that protection outside the Constitution, disregard the limitations imposed by sections 158–160, or assume that political authority confers immunity from legal accountability.

If the existing immunity framework is considered constitutionally objectionable, any proposed replacement must be justified by an independent, consistent and constitutionally lawful principle.

Otherwise, the reform becomes an exercise in selective accountability: denying protection to those who preceded them while reserving protection for those who now exercise power.

The ultimate question is not whether reformers have the political power to change the law. It is whether they can lawfully change the constitutional order without destroying the legal foundations upon which their own authority, legitimacy and protection depend.

ANA ROKOMOKOTI is in a PHD program and former Head of School Law and currently Part Time Law Reform Commissioner. The views expressed herein are hers alone.