The principle of “one person, one vote, one value” is greatly prized in the electoral world, and Fiji’s current system – an Open List Proportional Representation (OLPR) with a single, multi-member national constituency – operationalises this ideal in its truest form. This means that every vote cast in the Fijian national elections carries the same value regardless of the voter’s ethnicity, geographic region, or any other factor. For instance, a vote cast in Udu Point holds precisely the same weight as one cast in Suva. By contrast, when a country is segmented into multiple electoral districts, inequalities cannot be avoided. Consider two hypothetical districts: Constituency A, with 12,000 voters getting to elect one representative, and Constituency B, with 9000 voters also getting to elect one representative. This would translate into the value of the votes cast in Constituency B having a higher value than those in Constituency A, and mean that voters in Constituency B will have a greater impact on the election outcome, thereby violating the all-important equal value principle.
IN the past, when Fiji was carved up into multiple electoral districts (open and communal constituencies), there was a significant incidence of this, and it had grave democratic implications. Kesaia Seniloli in her article “Fiji’s Electoral Boundaries and Malapportionment” has demonstrated how election outcomes in 1999, 2001, and 2006 were heavily influenced by how demographic distributions and constituency boundaries were drawn. Despite the best efforts of the Constituency Boundaries Commission to adhere to the constitutional requirement of equal voter weight, this was difficult to achieve. The open constituencies were particularly complex to delimit because they had to meet two criteria simultaneously: equal numbers of voters and a balanced ethnic composition. Despite exploring alternative shapes (e.g., strips or oblong areas), the commission was constrained by existing administrative boundaries and the natural settlement patterns — such as Indo-Fijians concentrated in certain areas and iTaukei in others. The resulting 25 open constituencies mostly had a dominant ethnic group. Political parties and some academics criticised the outcome, arguing that more heterogeneous open constituencies could have supported cross-ethnic co-operation and moderated electoral results.
In the current single electoral district that we have, there is absolutely no scope for gerrymandering. Gerrymandering is the deliberate manipulation of electoral boundaries to favour a particular political party or group, and has long undermined the ideal of equal representation. Gerrymandering involves redrawing district lines to either cluster or dilute specific voter demographics, often leading to outcomes that do not reflect the true will of the people. This practice distorts fair competition by creating artificial advantages for certain parties and political interests. In ethnically divided societies, gerrymandering can be particularly destructive. When district lines are manipulated, they are often drawn either to concentrate ethnic minority votes in a few districts or to disperse them so that their influence is minimised. Such tactics have been documented in places like Malaysia or parts of Eastern Europe, where they lead to systematic underrepresentation, entrench majoritarian dominance, and fuel social tensions and voter disillusionment.
A single national constituency fundamentally changes the dynamics of electoral competition by removing the localised control over boundary drawing – a key tool in gerrymandering. Despite having no structural elements in the electoral system that afforded them an a priori advantage, the Bainimarama government was often accused of having established an undue advantage for itself. Given Fiji’s history of distrust in its electoral institutions, one can only imagine the implications if we were to regress and adopt a system which would actually allow the incumbent party to set electoral districts that give it advantage, or which diminish the value of certain voters against that of others.
Another advantage of a single national constituency lies in the way that it rewards more broad and inclusive politics. Given Fiji’s history of divisive politics, is it desirable to have an electoral system that rewards candidates and parties with a broad national appeal or those with a narrow, parochial approach? A single national constituency encourages parties to broaden their appeal, and to also campaign beyond areas where they have their stronghold. In the past, for example, the Ba Open constituency was a safe seat for the Fiji Labour Party, and most other parties did not even bother to campaign there. This dynamic also contributed to voter apathy, as many believed that votes in certain constituencies would not matter, which is one key reason for the low voter turnout experienced under the previous AV system, despite voting being compulsory.
These are some of the main advantages of having a single national constituency in Fiji. The only drawback, which critics have disproportionately highlighted, is the potentially weakened link between voters and their elected representatives. It is important to remember that no electoral system is perfect; each design invariably comes with certain tradeoffs. It is important to point out that no electoral system is perfect. Whenever design choices are made, there would inevitably be some tradeoffs. In Fiji’s case, there are at least three very solid rationales for favouring a national single constituency against this one disadvnatge.
However, when we analyse the actual impact of this perceived disadvantage using available evidence, it does not appear to be such a deal breaker. The primary rationale for linking MPs to specific electorates is to increase their accountability. When we analyse the results of the 2014, 2018 and 2022 at the candidate level (the FEO App was an invaluable resource for doing this!), we see that candidates who failed to maintain links with their electorate suffered substantial decreases in their vote share from one election to the next. This clearly demonstrates that the current system is indeed capable of holding MPs to account, and it has in fact been doing so effectively.
Contrast this to the common complaint that we had under the previous multiple constituencies system complaining that the only time that MPs visit them was during or close to election times. Contrast this with the common experience from the previous multiple constituencies system, where voters used to often complain that the only time that MPs visit them was during or close to election times. Now, one of the realities of that system in Fiji was that voters had very limited choices who they could vote for. This was also a consequence of the race based two-party system that had resulted under AV system in the 1997 constitution where most voters felt that they no other viable choice, but to vote for the candidate that one of the two major parties (SDL and FLP) had fielded in their electoral district, even if they personally disliked the candidate or had found them to be non-performing or ineffective. The current system, therefore, has increased voter agency and actually increased accountability, if we consider the evidence objectively.
In conclusion, Fiji’s single national constituency system upholds the cherished principle of “one person, one vote, one value” while effectively eliminating the risk of gerrymandering. It also encourages inclusive, broad-based politics. Although some critics question the direct connection between elected representatives and constituents, recent election data shows that those who neglect their electorate face tangible drops in support. This robust mechanism for accountability contrasts sharply with the previous multiple-constituency model, where voters often felt compelled to back unresponsive candidates due to limited candidate choices. While no electoral design is flawless, the evidence suggests that Fiji’s current system does more to safeguard democratic values, enhance voter agency, and ensure fair representation than the previous one.
n NILESH LAL is the executive director of Dialogue Fiji. The views expressed in this article are the author’s and not necessarily shared by this newspaper.
