A key objective of Dialogue Fiji is to strengthen public understanding of democracy, constitutionalism, and the institutional architecture that underpins governance in Fiji. In recent conversations, including public statements and interpretations advanced by political actors, we have observed a recurring misunderstanding about the constitutional role of the President. These discussions suggest a belief that the President possesses independent or discretionary authority capable of altering or resisting executive decisions.
This explainer seeks to clarify that misunderstanding.
PUBLIC discourse in Fiji often reflects confusion about the constitutional position of the President. This confusion is not merely semantic. It goes to the heart of how power is structured, exercised, and legitimised in a democratic system. At its core lies a simple, but frequently overlooked truth: The President of Fiji is a ceremonial figurehead with no discretionary powers.
This is not an incidental feature of Fiji’s constitutional design, but rather a deliberate and principled choice.
The Constitution of Fiji establishes the President as Head of State and formally vests executive authority in the office.
However, this vesting is immediately and decisively qualified. The President does not exercise executive authority independently. Instead, the Constitution requires that the President act only on advice. This single provision defines the presidency and confines it within narrow constitutional boundaries.
The President must act on advice tendered by Cabinet, a minister, or another body or authority that the Constitution expressly empowers for a specific function. There is no discretion embedded within it, no implied room for independent judgment, and no residual authority that the President may invoke in moments of disagreement or political controversy.
In ordinary usage, the word “advice” suggests a recommendation that may be accepted or rejected. However, the word “advice”, as used in the Constitution, does not invite deliberation or choice. It requires compliance.
Once advice is given by a constitutionally authorised actor, the President is bound to act in accordance with it. The President cannot refuse the advice and do whatever he or she wishes. That power does not exist. The President cannot pause to reflect on whether the advice is wise, fair, or politically palatable. Nor can the President substitute personal judgment for that of the elected executive.
To suggest otherwise is to misunderstand the constitutional architecture entirely.
In practical terms, therefore, what the Constitution describes as “advice” operates as an instruction or directive. While the softer language of advice is retained for reasons of constitutional tradition and formality, its legal effect is compulsory. Whenever an “advice” is given, it has to be followed. The President’s role is procedural and the office exists to give formal legal effect to decisions made elsewhere, not to assess their merits.
This absence of discretion is not a flaw, but rather a safeguard.
If the President were permitted to refuse advice, the presidency would become an unelected centre of power capable of obstructing or overriding the will of elected institutions. Such an arrangement would be deeply problematic in a democratic system.
It would allow authority to be exercised without electoral accountability. The Constitution consciously avoids this outcome.
The President of Fiji is not elected by the people. We do not have a presidential system where the office carries popular mandate. In democratic theory, legitimacy flows from the ballot box. Those who wield decision-making power must be answerable to voters. Fiji’s Constitution reflects this principle by locating substantive authority in elected institutions such as Parliament, the Prime Minister, and Cabinet.
These actors derive their legitimacy directly or indirectly from elections. They are accountable to the electorate and subject to political sanction.
By confining the President to a ceremonial role and denying discretionary power, the Constitution ensures that political authority remains where democratic legitimacy resides.
The consequences of this design are significant.
If the President were to refuse to act on advice, such refusal would be unconstitutional. The President would be failing to perform a core constitutional function. The refusal would have no legal effect and would not create an alternative lawful outcome. Instead, it would expose the President to constitutional consequences.
The Constitution provides mechanisms for addressing such failures, including the president’s removal from office. Courts may also intervene to enforce constitutional compliance.
The system does not resolve such a crisis by empowering the President. It resolves it by reaffirming constitutional supremacy.
In this sense, the presidency is a stabilising institution rather than a competing one. It symbolises the State, performs ceremonial functions, and ensures continuity, but it does not govern. It reigns, but it does not rule.
Understanding this distinction matters. It clarifies where responsibility lies when decisions provoke controversy or legal challenge. Responsibility (and liability) rests with those who give the advice, not with the President who is constitutionally obliged to act upon it.
In conclusion, by denying discretionary power to an unelected office, Fiji’s Constitution affirms a foundational democratic principle: that authority must only be exercised by those who are chosen by the people and accountable to them.
The ceremonial presidency is therefore not an anomaly. It is an expression of democratic restraint.
NILESH LAL is the Executive Director of Dialogue Fiji, a civil society organisation working on strengthening democracy, human rights, and social cohesion in Fiji. A political scientist by training, he writes frequently on governance and development issues in Fiji.
