I wish to apologise at the outset for missing out in the last two weeks. This was because I was out of the country on a long-delayed trip and there was accumulated work to plough through upon return. I will write about that trip later. Prior to that, we followed the link between the beche-de-mer trade, presence of foreign traders and the quest for power and territory in pre-colonial Fiji. We highlighted how Seru Cakobau clearly understood the significance of trade, territory, power and the forging of alliances both with local kingdoms, white settlers and enterprising foreign traders who ebbed and flowed through Fijian shores at the time. All these elements had a tendency to change allegiances without any warning as soon as they sensed, or saw, shifts in power among the local chieftains and tribes. Let us focus a bit more on the beche-de-mer trade before taking this further.
Beche-de-mer and power
The beche-de-mer trade peaked in the 1840s even though it followed sandalwood through the 1820s and 30s. There is evidence that Tanoa was involved in it largely as a protector of peace that allowed trade with some parts accruing to Bau. Seru changed this after suppressing the rebellion in Bau in 1836. That rebellion had led to the banishment of Tanoa from Bau in 1832. So, from 1832 to 1836, the beche-de-mer trade had involved a number of chieftainships. Seru’s role in attempting to consolidate and control this trade can be directly linked to his remarkably acute understanding of the links between power and wealth. He was well versed in this as he was a product of the same. Beche-de-mer was a highly valued and lucrative commodity. In 1849, Captain Wallis managed to put together a cargo worth nearly 6000 pounds in about nine months. The articles of trade were similar to those used for the purchase of sandalwood earlier, but this time it better reflected the changed conditions among the native people who desired muskets and ammunition. However, whales’ teeth, iron tools, beads and ornaments still had their place. On the other end, the principal market was at Manila, where the cargoes of beche-de-mer were sold to merchants for shipment to China, and the ships took on tea, sugar, and silks, for the homeward voyage. One ship got 840 piculs (60.48kg) at a cost of 1200 dollars, and the cargo sold at Manila for 12,600 dollars. It was reported that the Glide (a trading vessel) got 500 piculs of beche-de-mer and 300 pounds of tortoise shell in a little over a month. The picul was a Chinese measure used in the silk trade equalling 60.48kg or 133.3 pounds. (http://www.janesoceania.com/fiji_discovery1/index.htm) Bau’s control over trade, especially in beche-de-mer, went back to the 1830s and 40s largely because of its geographical location and because of its links and sway with chiefs in the Northern coasts of Vanua Levu and Viti Levu. Sahlins (2004, p.35) wrote that, “Bau was able to differentially draw power from European trade, both goods and personnel, because it already had the power to control (that trade)”. Seru’s hold over this was hugely dented by his defeat at Macuata in 1852. He had begun to hanker for the trappings and elevated positioning of dominant ruler/kings like King George Tupou (Siaosi Taufa’ahau) of Tonga (Heasley, 1983, p.161; FT 13/09/25). In the process, Seru Cakobau became engaged in a vain attempt to extend his power and authority beyond Fijian reasoning, and more importantly, beyond his military capacities (Williams and Calvert, 1859, p.464).
The Debilitating Blow in Macuata
In 1850, as the war with Rewa waged on, Cakobau ordered two expensive European boats that he promised to pay with proceeds from the beche-de-mer trade. In order to meet this purchase obligation, he had to impose unprecedented levies on key chieftains in the North. The problem was that, aside from kinship and political connections, Seru did not have any direct authority over the chiefs in those regions. He sent out bags to these areas to be filled with cured beche-de-mer but there was virtually no compliance. In a sortie to follow up on his demand aboard the newly acquired vessel, Thakombau, he found unused, dumped and burnt bags. An undeclared rebellion appeared to be in the air! By 1851, he decided that he needed to make a public spectacle of the consequences of defying him. Remember, this was before he converted to Christianity in 1854. Thus, this spectacle would have involved publicly subduing and ritually killing a prominent chief and eating his heart and liver while sharing the rest with his key warriors. He chose his most problematic adversary, Ratu Ritova of Macuata, for this. One of the largest fighting forces ever seen in Fiji was gathered for this campaign. More than 2000 warriors boarded around 200 canoes as Cakobau led the flotilla in the much envied and admired Thakombau and paraded them along the coast below Ritova’s fortress in an attempt to intimidate him. The problem was that Cakobau’s army was a disparate grouping that had been put together hastily at a time when his power was seen to be waning in the face of Rewan successes. He had no direct power over the group that he led, and he was aware of it, so he finally attacked with only 300 Bauan warriors over whom he had direct control. The result was not only humiliating but it had a huge impact on the image of Seru’s military prowess and relative strength in his ongoing wars with Rewa. Seru lost 10 men, his allies decamped and left him bereft, and those who remained refused to fish for the beche-de-mer that had forced this vain campaign. They said that it was menial work unfit for warriors and Cakobau returned to Bau a beaten and desperate chief. Captain Wallis, a witness to the happenings around Cakobau at this time wrote, “Bau, instead of being feared at present, is becoming the object of derision of many parts of the coast” (Wallis, 1994, p.74). This defeat of Cakobau in Macuata in 1852 is significant for a number of reasons. One, he had become extremely hegemonic in his designs. Two, he overestimated his sway over the maritime tribes that he had long-established socio-political links with. Three, he was now being openly defied as seen in the fact that Ritova declared his had been done through Bau all this time. Five, resident Europeans began to collude with Rewa and disaffected rebels in Bau. This is what led to Cakobau’s drubbing at the Battle of Kaba in 1853 (see FT 30/08/25). More was on the horizon.
Bau in Decline
Of course, Cakobau’s fortunes changed at the next Battle of Kaba in 1855, but the circumstances and the forces at play released currents of change that were to prove pivotal in what followed in Fiji’s development and political evolution. It is no secret that Cakobau’s conversion to Christianity and consequent support from Tongan forces were key factors that led to Cakobau’s victory at Kaba in 1855. However, his loss of control over the beche-de-mer trade, his defeat in 1853 and his “lucky victory” in 1855 raised more questions than answers about his capacity to lead Fiji. Another, little exposed, nugget of history clearly left a huge stain on Cakobau’s image as a warrior unparalleled. In September 1858, Ma’afu landed in Bua and rampaged up the Macuata coast to Natakala “town” where they engaged Ratu Ritova’s forces who fled into the bushes in disarray. Ma’afu’s lieutenant, Semisi, was tasked to pursue and apprehend them, but he failed and only managed to extend an invitation to them to meet in the local church “on Sunday morning”. About 30 Macuata warriors arrived trusting that the Tongans, who were avowed Wesleyans, would not disrespect the House of God and spare them. Unfortunately, all of them were ritually slaughtered by Mafi who Semisi delegated the task to. This became a huge reputational burden for Cakobau as Ma’afu had succeeded where he had failed against Ritova. That name still persists in the chiefly lineages of Labasa Furthermore, it was clear that the Europeans in Levuka had emerged as an independent force with their own political agenda and they were ready to pitch on their own behalf into whatever happened in Fiji post 1855. They were no longer willing to go through Bau to realise their aims and ambitions. The Mata ki Bau (David Whippy) was no longer pivotal for success. He had always used his Bauan status both on behalf of Bau and for himself (Wilkes, 1845, 3: 184-86). Now the Europeans were ready to join the political fray more directly. We will continue this next week. Sa moce toka mada.
- Dr SUBHASH APPANNA is a senior USP academic who has been writing regularly on issues of historical and national significance. The views expressed here are his alone and not necessarily shared by this newspaper or his employers subhash.appana@usp.ac.fj
