Two weeks ago, we analysed how the fateful container with its arsenal of death and destruction was moved through official channels right under the scrutiny of apparently unsuspecting customs officials up to the dispersal of its contents to various locations in the West of Viti Levu. We said there were various factors at play and that Fiji was fractured by the May 1987 coup. It was these fractures that Mohammed Rafik Kahan exploited to get his deadly cargo on site. Here, we focus on how an international movement for democracy in Fiji was used by a cabal of concerned people and opportunists to garner funds and appropriate weapons for a destructive insurrection in Fiji.
A campaign for democracy
MOST of the people involved in the arms conspiracy were part of the Movement for Democracy in Fiji. This movement was set up in June 1987 with a focus on restoring democracy in Fiji. This, of course, meant reinstating the illegally removed Bavadra government. As part of its campaign, key members of the ousted government embarked on an international campaign that took them to Apia (Pacific Islands Forum), Washington, London, Canberra, Wellington and Canada (CHOGM).
The people who fronted up this campaign from the ousted government – Dr Timoci Bavadra, Dr Tupeni Baba, Jai Ram Reddy, Krishna Dutt, Joeli Kalou, Bhupendra Patel and others – had a genuine case for the restoration of democracy in Fiji and they approached the right authorities who had always championed and campaigned for democracy within the tight international political bloc that Fiji was a part of at that time. Unfortunately for these leaders of the short-lived Bavadra government, the reception they got when they knocked on these doors of power was lukewarm at best.
In Samoa (1987), Henry Naisali, who was then Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum, took a hands-off stance on Fiji even though the forum meeting issued a general statement that expressed “deep concern and anguish … at the overthrow of the elected government in Fiji” but “recognising the complexity of the problems” expressed hopes “for a peaceful and satisfactory solution to the current problems” (SPF, 1987a, para 5). Virtually the same happened at the forum meeting in 1988. Many have pointed at Ratu Mara’s involvement in the post-coup administrations as the reason why international condemnation never gained traction.
Fiji was inexorably heading towards an authoritarian, ethnically exclusive political regime. In the meantime, atrocities being committed against the Indo-Fijians continued to escalate. It was this that triggered talks of military intervention in the troubled country. This evolved into a clandestine conspiracy that was hatched and developed around the fringes of the Movement for Democracy in Fiji. There is no evidence that any member of the Bavadra government was directly involved. In fact, this was categorically denied by Dr Tupeni Baba in an interview with the The Fiji Times years later (FT 30/06/2015). Moreover, Dr Bavadra repeatedly prohibited that option in no uncertain terms.
Despite this there were those who were convinced that the Rabuka regime of 1987 had “embarked on ethnic cleansing at a grand scale” (Anon). There had to be a response to “balance the equation”. Add to this the many other grievances and fissures identified last week, and we had the critical core of believers needed to make the search for weapons a reality. According to Harder (1988), Kahan intimated to him that a group of five was set up in 1987 to plan and organise the guns for Fiji. The group grew in size as the project began to take shape. These individuals came from the UK, the US, Canada, Australia and Fiji.
A number of names were revealed to Harder when he visited Kahan a number of times in Brixton Jail in 1988. Some of the names included Ratu Mosese Tuisawau, Ratu Meli Vesikula, Sahadeo and Nagans Steel Rolling Mills among others. I do not extend this list here because the veracity of Kahan’s longer list of names cannot be ascertained. At least two other insiders confirmed some names on the wider list. Those listed here were part of police records at the time and these same names also appeared in a number of reports. It is also no secret that Kahan met and had lunch at a hotel in Suva with the two Ratu’s mentioned here. Coming back to the initial group of five it is obvious that they had to have political clout.
Dealing for weapons
The expedition for weapons had two prongs: one was a search for funds and the other was for weapons. All sources have been unequivocal in the pivotal role played by Rafik Kahan in the guns’ saga. He brought to the cabal widespread contacts, organising skills and a level of deceptiveness and cunning that is not common among ordinary felons. Kahan’s network extended from the international arms dealer, Adnan Kashoggi to Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leader, Yasser Arafat to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to Libyan strongman, Muammar Gaddafi. He also insisted that he had close contacts with members of the former Alliance government.
An insider intimated to me that Kahan was using the Fiji Government letterhead and boldly forging ousted PM Bavadra’s signature in his search for international funding and support. This is corroborated by Christopher Harder in his book, The Guns of Lautoka. In one letter dated June 4, 1988 addressed to The chairman, LTTE Central Committee, Kahan (impersonating Dr Bavadra) wrote, “I as the Democratically elected Prime Minister of Fiji, …. hereby give authority to MOHAMMED 191366, our special envoy and the Commander-in-Chief of the Fiji Militia Forces to discuss and seek ….” (Harder 1988, p.233).
Members of this clandestine cabal also approached aides around Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Vancouver, Canada during the 10th Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in October 1988 (Anon). The pitch was that something had to be done in Fiji because democracy was under peril in that paradise of the Pacific. I am told that the reception was positive, but the plan for an armed insurrection was given the cold shoulder by the Indian delegation. Ironically it was an LTTE operative, a suicide bomber, who assassinated PM Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991. Both of these parties had been approached by Kahan for military assistance.
It is interesting that the search for arms continued after the one container was seized in Fiji. On June 30, 1988, Kahan wrote to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) chairman, Yasser Arafat seeking assistance to raise “40 million pounds sterling against the irrevocable bank guarantee from Barclays Bank, London. … Our set-back in Sydney, Australia has given us greater strength and determination to overcome the military government of Col. Rabuka and the Israelis” (Harder 1988, p.234). This letter was a follow-on from one sent to the PLO two weeks earlier on June 15, 988. Kahan was clearly playing on Arafat’s ongoing conflict with Israel. His diary entries further revealed that he travelled to Tunis to meet Libyan officials also in June 1988. Obviously, Muammar Gaddafi was on his radar.
It is interesting that out of so many prominent financial institutions that he could have mentioned for gravitas in this letter, Kahan used the name of Barclays. I do not think this was coincidental because Barclays Bank had indeed been operational in Fiji up until 1985 when it sold its operations to ANZ Bank. Thus, Barclays was a name that could be easily linked to Fiji in an era when wider information was not readily available.
Anyway, what we do know is that no more weapons arrived in Fiji after the Guns of Lautoka. One of Kahan’s close associates recently wrote to me saying, “I suspect Kahan conned some Arab leaders for we never saw any money from him.” In other words, after the container was seized in Lautoka, Kahan the revolutionary went back to being Kahan the conman. The ever-enterprising son of Raiwaqa was back in his element and attempting to milk the political instability and uncertainty in Fiji for as long as he could.
Before I sign off here, I wish to acknowledge and thank Qasenivuli Paul Geraghty (FT 24/03/25) for pointing out a factual error in my last article. Indeed, Sir Arthur Gordon “froze” the provinces as he saw them; the three confederacies appeared later. Next week, I will focus on how local law enforcement managed to get to what was in the container and some additional happenings around it. Until then, have a great week.
- DR. SUBHASH APPANNA is a senior USP academic who has been writing regularly on issues of historical and national significance. The views expressed here are his alone and not necessarily shared by this newspaper or his employers subhash.appana@usp.ac.fj
