The Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) has been on the national discourse agenda since its high-profile prosecutions against two deputy prime ministers. Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka recently told the media that wide-ranging reforms to the institution will soon begin. He stated that planned reforms will mean that FICAC will no longer function as a fully independent body but will instead be integrated into the Fiji Police Force, with a dedicated anti-corruption section created within the police structure. The Prime Minister said the reform aims to bring FICAC “within the Police just like separate sections looking at certain issues.” He also denied that the coalition government has misused FICAC as a political instrument.
Why an ICAC?
THE idea of an Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) is a noble one.
The concept was born out of frustration with the inability of ordinary law enforcement systems to tackle entrenched corruption, particularly where corruption had already penetrated the police and the political class.
It was first tried in Hong Kong in the 1970s, when corruption had become systemic, and ordinary citizens had lost faith in the state.
After the Peter Godber scandal, where a senior police officer fled Hong Kong to avoid prosecution, the government established the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in 1974.
It was given wide powers and, most importantly, independence from the police and the civil service.
The results were extraordinary. In just a few years, ICAC managed to clean up Hong Kong’s public sector, restore public trust, and make corruption a high-risk, low-reward enterprise.
Singapore followed a similar path, strengthening its Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) into one of the most effective anti-corruption agencies in the world.
Australia’s New South Wales also created its ICAC in 1989, focusing on investigation, prevention, and public education.
Each of these examples shows that where political will and true independence converge, success follows.
Fiji’s experience with FICAC
Fiji’s own version, the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC), was born of the same noble aspiration.
Fiji, like its Melanesian neighbours, has long struggled with corruption as a structural problem, and the creation of FICAC should have been greeted with optimism.
It should have been seen by everyone as an ally of the people against abuse of power. Instead, FICAC has often been viewed as a political weapon rather than an independent integrity institution.
For many years, FICAC’s prosecutions have been seen through a political lens.
The perception, rightly or wrongly, is that the Commission is politicised and that it targets opponents of those in power while ignoring wrongdoing within the corridors of power.
This has badly eroded public trust in the institution.
So much so that during the 2022 general elections, the People’s Alliance Party promised in its manifesto to dismantle FICAC altogether once in government.
That was a misguided position. Dismantling FICAC would have meant discarding years of accumulated expertise and technical knowledge in fighting corruption.
FICAC’s greatest asset is its people — the investigators, prosecutors, and legal officers who have spent years training to combat corruption and who understand how it operates in Fiji.
These are specialised skills that cannot be easily replaced or replicated.
Rather than dismantling the institution, the better course is to reform it to make it genuinely independent, credible, trusted, and respected.
A noble idea undermined by political interference
The problem has never been with the idea of FICAC. The problem has been with the politics surrounding it. Since its controversial establishment under a post-coup military regime, FICAC has been plagued by questions about its independence.
Successive governments have been accused of using it as a tool to silence or intimidate opponents.
When the current coalition government was in opposition, it made repeated claims that the previous administration had weaponised FICAC.
Now in government, it was expected to ensure that this misuse would end.
Yet the recent Commission of Inquiry concluded that “weaponisation” is still occurring.
This demonstrates that the underlying problem, ie political control over appointments and leadership, remains unaddressed.
The legal framework
Under Section 115 of the 2013 Constitution, FICAC is established as an independent body.
The section also provides that the remuneration of the Commissioner is determined by the President on the advice of the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) after consultation with the Attorney-General.
However, the Constitution is silent on the procedure for appointing the Commissioner.
That process is contained in the FICAC Act 2007, which states that the Commissioner shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Services Commission, after consultation with the Attorney-General.
While that appears clear on paper, in practice it has been interpreted inconsistently.
The 2013 Constitution requires that the President acts only on the advice of entities prescribed by law, and while this makes sense for a ceremonial presidency, it creates ambiguity when read together with the FICAC Act.
A recent legal opinion by King’s Counsel Philip Joseph has complicated this further. His advice suggested that where the FICAC Commissioner is suspended, the President can appoint an Acting Deputy Commissioner on the advice of the Prime Minister alone.
This interpretation is highly problematic. It effectively allows the Prime Minister to hand-pick the person who will lead FICAC without the involvement of the Judicial Services Commission.
This opens the door to even greater political capture of the institution.
The need for a consensus-based appointment process
The 2013 Constitution is often criticised for giving excessive power to the executive. However, the absence of constitutional safeguards does not prevent the executive from acting prudently, doing the right thing, and setting a high standard for governance.
The Constitution does not forbid the government from consulting widely and building broad consensus before making an appointment.
What Fiji lacks is not the legal space to do this, but the political will.
To restore public confidence in FICAC, Fiji should adopt a consensus-based appointment process for both the Commissioner and any Acting Commissioner. The Judicial Services Commission and the Attorney-General, as the legally prescribed appointing authorities, must hold consultations with all major political and professional stakeholders before advising on any appointment.
These stakeholders should include:
The Prime Minister and his Deputy Prime Ministers (representing coalition partners).
The Leader of the Opposition.
The Chief Justice, as Chair of the JSC.
The President of the Fiji Law Society, representing the legal profession.
A process built on consultation with these parties would allow consensus to emerge around a candidate who commands broad confidence across society.
The goal is not a majority decision but a consensus appointment that strengthens legitimacy and shields the Commission from accusations of bias.
What Fiji should do now
Fiji must preserve FICAC (contrary to what the PAP manifesto stated) and reform it around three key principles.
First, institutional independence must be guaranteed through a consensus-based appointment process.
The JSC and Attorney-General should not act alone but should consult the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, Leader of the Opposition, Chief Justice, and President of the Fiji Law Society.
Their collective endorsement would give the appointee moral authority and legitimacy.
Second, acting appointments should follow the same process. If the Commissioner is suspended, the Prime Minister should not be making the appointment unilaterally.
(I refrain from saying that the President makes the appointment because the President cannot act on his own accord.)
Instead, the Prime Minister should consult and build consensus with his coalition partners, the Leader of the Opposition, the Chief Justice, and the President of the Fiji Law Society before advising the President whom to appoint as Acting Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner.
Third, transparency must accompany every appointment.
The process and the reasons for the choice should be made public.
This would show the people that appointments are based on merit, not loyalty.
Conclusion
FICAC is not beyond redemption. It can be transformed into a respected and trusted institution. The way forward is not to dismantle it, or to take away its independence, but to strengthen it.
The most important step is to make its leadership appointments genuinely independent through consensus, transparency, and consultation.
If Fiji is serious about tackling corruption, it must learn from the success of the ICACs of Hong Kong, Singapore, and New South Wales.
Those institutions are trusted because their leadership is selected through clear processes that safeguard against political interference and unilateral appointments. Fiji can and must do the same.
A Commissioner appointed through consensus with the confidence of the government, the opposition, the judiciary, and the legal profession will have the credibility and authority to act without fear or favour.
That is the only way to make FICAC what it was meant to be: a true guardian of integrity and the public interest.
NILESH LAL is the Executive Director of Dialogue Fiji, a civil society organisation working on strengthening democracy, human rights, and social cohesion in Fiji. A political scientist by training, he writes frequently on governance and development issues in Fiji. The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not reflect the views of this newspaper.
